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DNS

HtmlToText

about cv tag category family tree social github twitter facebook google+ linkedin about cv tag category family tree social github twitter facebook google+ linkedin manifesto for cybersecurity mon, may 22, 2017 tech #security the recent ransomware attacks have focused lots of minds onto cyber security, however many of the solutions being proposed are little more than sticking plasters to the larger underlying issue - namely systems are not secure by default. the ‘trend’ in software has been to launch it, then fix it. this is a very attractive proposition for business, as it lets them discover the ideas that work and don’t work, and then iteratively improve them. most of the gadgets we use in our lives today would not exist without this mentality. however the dark side of this approach is almost all software is not secure, the evidence is pretty much every system deployed has security flaws, the only question is who finds them first - bad people or good people. this situation is not going to be viable in the long term. technology is becoming a larger and larger part of our lives and you cannot have an ecosystem of software collapsing every few months or years because someone has found a weakness. in 10-15 years all our transport, logistics, energy, entertainment will be dependent on systems - such an attack could literally kill millions and send us back to the dark ages - the uk emergency committee (amusingly named cobra) has a saying - that we’re 9 meals from anarchy . a few years ago in the uk we had a ‘petrol’ strike where the tanker drivers refused to deliver fuel, this very nearly broke the entire food supply chain in a few short days. in it this is solvable - the it industry need to stand up and take some responsibility for this mess we’ve created. our obsession with innovation and speed is now coming with too high a price, and if something doesn’t change, it will kill people. the sticking plaster approaches to security get more and more complex and less effective over time, and this will all end in tears if action is not taken. it may take government regulations to force it, hopefully not - as they are blunt tools, but action must be taken. therefore i’d like to propose a manifesto (being election season in the uk) we take onboard as an industry… we will not ship software that does not have updatability - all software must be able to be securely updated, we know we make mistakes, we know we have to be able to fix them. integrity - all software should have integrity built in, if it’s been messed with it should not just be blinding charge ahead doing what the attacker wants. security outcomes not security features - tick lists of security features is not security, focus on the outcome of a secure system, not if you’ve got all the ‘usual’ check boxes. this usually means you’ve done a threat analysis and have got a plan for at least the known threats. logging/telemetry - if you’re being attacked, tell someone - if no-one knows, no-one can respond a diverse ecosystem - if we all use the same tools, libraries, suppliers one attacker can take us all out, we need diversity software written complying with this manifesto would still be vulnerable to attacks, that is never going to change, however the outcome of such an attack is different. let’s analyse the wannacry ransomware attack and what could have changed…. wannacry started by infecting a small numbers of pc’s and then spreading. the first pc’s it infected should have noticed something changed ( integrity ) the pc should have reported it - possibly to their users, local admins or microsoft ( logging/telemetry ). that would have allowed microsoft to notice, further warn people and to issue patches ( updatability ) users would have been able to take action (patch or turn computer off) the computer itself could take action - preventing it’s integrity being further compromised if these organizations had a diverse range of technology (say some macs or linux) they’d have found themselves not totally stuck when their windows pc’s got infected. this is not to say mac’s/linux are perfect for security, but the diversity itself is a benefit. many of these computers would have had anti-virus installed, but it didn’t work ( outcomes not features ), anti-virus although useful in some cases is far from an panacea and gives a false sense of security, if the people running these computers had focused on the outcome, as opposed to just ticking boxes they may have solved this another way (e.g disconnect them from the internet) the end result in a compliant ecosystem, such an attack would be a minor annoyance, and not a disaster. it’s simply building in some resilience. if we take another (unfortunately common example) - a website with a security blunder in it that allows attackers to gain access to a server. often these attacks result in data loss, or worse, yet with these axioms there are many places they can be stopped. the process of web application suffers a code injection, and runs the attackers code - it should notice (integrity) and report it ( logging/telemetry ) then the first server gets infected and the attackers starts adding tools to gain remote access - it should notice (integrity) and report it ( logging/telemetry ) the system admin should notice and should take action and update the app, or disable the server to prevent spreading. if the application is built with diversity the same attack should not easily execute on other servers preventing rapid spread. the hacked server should ensure the credentials it utilized to access other servers (databases etc) are locked to it’s application code ( integrity ) - preventing the attacker from pivoting onwards the network security should not just rely on the server being trusted and should insist on applications authenticating themselves ( integrity ) the system admins should have reviewed the security model and made sure that hackers can’t pivot ( outcomes not features ) and that all the expected attack trees were protected we are not going to be able to remove security as a problem from it systems, they are now sufficiently complex we can’t fix it . however we can design a diverse ecosystem of integral software, that logs issues, allows updates and is designed to handle the threats it’s likely to encounter. the is a case that some standards are needed, poorly designed software is analogous to overuse of anti-biotics - everyone who does it, has little motivation to fix it, but as a society we are all hurt by this behavior, and over time it’s going to get really serious for us all. wannacrypt was it good for the security industry? mon, may 15, 2017 tech #security this weekend we saw ‘the biggest cyber attack ever’ and a few people (who don’t work in it) have asked me - will it be good for you (as i work for irdeto - a digital platform security company). it’s an interesting question to consider - these big attacks make a lot of noise, so you’d expect on monday morning the business of cyber security will get easier! however i think the reality is a bit more nuanced. the first big impact of the attack is everyone is talking about cyber security. this must be a good thing for the security industry, far too often, i find, people don’t take cyber security seriously. this is often a factor of how humans think, we are very bad at estimating and reacting to risks and cyber security is one of those things that seems so big and scary it’s easier to ignore it. it would be great if this morning the world was systematically analysing their cyber security risk, but i think what will actually happen is sticking plasters will be applied, it will be noted down by many as on of those things that happens, and life will continue as it always did. we will probably find some people moving to address cyber security, and i think over time governments and regulators will start treating the overall it security of their country as something they have to worry about, but that will take sev

URL analysis for gidley.co.uk

https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/05/wanntcryptor-2.0-ransomware-and-negligence/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/01/n26/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#convince-user-to-install-mitm-certificate
https://www.gidley.co.uk/tags/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/05/wannacrypt-was-it-good-for-the-security-industry/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#malicious-browser-extensions
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-browsers
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2016/11/human-momentum/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#tls-ssl-breaks
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/01/certs-again/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/categories/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#aquire-vendor-issued-trusted-certificate
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/04/are-you-feeling-lucky/
https://www.gidley.co.uk/#convince-user-to-install-software
https://www.gidley.co.uk/2017/01/kaspersky/
theregister.co.uk
bbc.co.uk

Whois Information

Whois is a protocol that is access to registering information. You can reach when the website was registered, when it will be expire, what is contact details of the site with the following informations. In a nutshell, it includes these informations;

Error for "gidley.co.uk".

the WHOIS query quota for 2600:3c03:0000:0000:f03c:91ff:feae:779d has been exceeded
and will be replenished in 156 seconds

WHOIS lookup made at 09:49:51 07-Oct-2017

--
This WHOIS information is provided for free by Nominet UK the central registry
for .uk domain names. This information and the .uk WHOIS are:

Copyright Nominet UK 1996 - 2017.

You may not access the .uk WHOIS or use any data from it except as permitted
by the terms of use available in full at http://www.nominet.uk/whoisterms,
which includes restrictions on: (A) use of the data for advertising, or its
repackaging, recompilation, redistribution or reuse (B) obscuring, removing
or hiding any or all of this notice and (C) exceeding query rate or volume
limits. The data is provided on an 'as-is' basis and may lag behind the
register. Access may be withdrawn or restricted at any time.

  REFERRER http://www.nominet.org.uk

  REGISTRAR Nominet UK

SERVERS

  SERVER co.uk.whois-servers.net

  ARGS gidley.co.uk

  PORT 43

  TYPE domain

DISCLAIMER
This WHOIS information is provided for free by Nominet UK the central registry
for .uk domain names. This information and the .uk WHOIS are:
Copyright Nominet UK 1996 - 2017.
You may not access the .uk WHOIS or use any data from it except as permitted
by the terms of use available in full at http://www.nominet.uk/whoisterms,
which includes restrictions on: (A) use of the data for advertising, or its
repackaging, recompilation, redistribution or reuse (B) obscuring, removing
or hiding any or all of this notice and (C) exceeding query rate or volume
limits. The data is provided on an 'as-is' basis and may lag behind the
register. Access may be withdrawn or restricted at any time.

  REGISTERED no

DOMAIN

  NAME gidley.co.uk

NSERVER

  NS3.DOMAINDISCOUNT24.NET 178.33.34.100

  NS2.DOMAINDISCOUNT24.NET 188.165.164.171

  NS1.DOMAINDISCOUNT24.NET 94.23.153.36

Mistakes

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